



Transportation Security Preparedness Plan to Address the Event of a Communicable Disease

February 2024



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Message from the Administrator

February 2024

I am pleased to issue the “*Transportation Security Preparedness Plan to Address the Event of a Communicable Disease*.” This plan was compiled under the *National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022*, Section 6412, “Transportation Security Preparedness Plan.” It responds to the requirement for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – acting through the Administrator and in coordination with the DHS Chief Medical Officer – to develop a transportation security preparedness plan to address the event of a communicable disease outbreak within the transportation security system.



The plan is designed to outline the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) preparation efforts, while acknowledging that other departments and agencies may have similar existing plans, protocols, or standard operating procedures. It describes TSA’s well-established communication and collaboration protocols and engagement platforms with appropriate federal departments and agencies, the workforce, international partners, transportation security stakeholders, and the traveling public. It defines the workforce protection capabilities TSA implements to minimize transmission of a communicable disease between members of its workforce and the traveling public.

Ultimately, TSA recognizes that successful preparation relies upon a whole-of-community approach and largely depends on collaboration and communication before the onset of a communicable disease outbreak.

Under congressional requirements, this plan is being provided to the following Members of Congress:

The Honorable Mark E. Green
Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Chairman, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

The Honorable Rand Paul
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

The Honorable Maria Cantwell
Chair, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

The Honorable Ted Cruz
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Inquiries relating to this plan may be directed to me at 571-227-2801 or TSA's Legislative Affairs office at 571-227-2717.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "David P. Pekoske". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

David P. Pekoske
Administrator

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Executive Summary

This *Transportation Security Preparedness Plan to Address the Event of a Communicable Disease*, and its appendices, comply with all requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2022, section 6412. When developing this plan, TSA considered the findings and analysis of surveys and plans, and the review of relevant documentation and information on the U.S. government's response to COVID-19 and other communicable disease outbreaks,¹ including the following:

- The findings of the survey required under section 6411 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022.
- The findings of the analysis required under section 6414 of the NDAA for FY 2022.
- The plan required under section 6415 of the NDAA for FY 2022.
- All relevant reports and recommendations regarding the Administration's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including any reports and recommendations issued by the Comptroller General and the Inspector General of the DHS.
- Lessons learned from federal interagency efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plan's purpose is to support the protection of the transportation security sector's workforce and to maintain essential functions and services by supporting and advising the lead federal agency (LFA) on transportation security matters in response to a communicable disease outbreak, as identified or declared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). While TSA and the transportation sector may be open for business during a communicable disease outbreak, some of TSA's preparedness and response activities may affect transportation sector partners. Therefore, the plan is intended to serve as a guide to be adapted to the prevailing situation, as needed.

The plan describes TSA's well-established communication and collaboration protocols and engagement platforms with appropriate federal departments and agencies, the workforce, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), international partners, transportation stakeholders, and the traveling public. It defines the workforce protection capabilities TSA brings to minimize transmission of a communicable disease between the traveling public and members of its workforce, especially Transportation Security Officers (TSO) and other frontline personnel. It also builds on TSA's emergency response capabilities as outlined in the *TSA Chemical, Biological, and Pandemic Response Base Plan* and integrates the incident management processes of the LFA.

TSA held numerous discussions within TSA and across the federal interagency (for example, Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), DHS Office of Health Security (OHS)) to ensure an accurate and thorough document. During those

¹ NIH.gov, (<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6454359/#:~:text=An%20outbreak%20is%20defined%20as,or%20a%20single%2C%20unexpected%20presentation.>) "An outbreak is defined as more cases of a disease than expected in a specific location over a specific time period. Suspicion often arises when health care workers report an unusual cluster or a single, unexpected presentation." "

discussions, TSA became better informed of interagency actions that help shape the transportation security system preparations for future disease outbreaks. This then allows TSA to be better positioned to protect its workforce and to communicate those protective measures to its partners.

The U.S. government cannot eliminate the risk of a communicable disease outbreak. However, the abundance of planning, communication and collaboration, and workforce protection actions that have occurred since the outset of COVID-19 make the U.S. transportation sector more prepared for future public health outbreaks.



Revision History

Version	Description	Modified by	Date

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1.0 LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE²

SEC. 6412. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PREPAREDNESS PLAN.

(a) PLAN REQUIRED – Section 114 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

(x) TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PREPAREDNESS PLAN -

(1) In general - Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Administrator, in coordination with the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland Security, and in consultation with the partners identified under paragraphs (3)(A)(i) through (3)(A)(iv), shall develop a transportation security preparedness plan to address the event of a communicable disease outbreak. The Secretary, acting through the Administrator, shall ensure such plan aligns with relevant Federal plans and strategies for communicable disease outbreaks.

(2) Considerations - In developing the plan required under paragraph (1), the Secretary, acting through the Administrator, shall consider each of the following:

(A) The findings of the survey required under section 6411 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.

(B) The findings of the analysis required under section 6414 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.

(C) The plan required under section 6415 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.

(D) All relevant reports and recommendations regarding the Administration's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including any reports and recommendations issued by the Comptroller General and the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security.

(E) Lessons learned from Federal interagency efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic.

(3) Contents of plan – The plan developed under paragraph

(1) shall include each of the following:

(A) Plans for communicating and collaborating in the event of a communicable disease outbreak with the following partners:

(i) Appropriate Federal departments and agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Labor, and appropriate interagency task forces.

(ii) The workforce of the Administration, including through the labor organization certified as the exclusive representative of full- and part-time non-supervisory Administration personnel carrying out screening functions under section 44901 of this title.

² SEC. 6412. *Transportation Security Preparedness Plan*. (<https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1605/text>).

(iii) International partners, including the International Civil Aviation Organization and foreign governments, airports, and air carriers.

(iv) Public and private stakeholders, as such term is defined under subsection (t)(1)(C).

(v) The traveling public.

(B) Plans for protecting the safety of the Transportation Security Administration workforce, including—

(i) reducing the risk of communicable disease transmission at screening checkpoints and within the Administration's workforce related to the Administration's transportation security operations and mission;

(ii) ensuring the safety and hygiene of screening checkpoints and other workstations;

(iii) supporting equitable and appropriate access to relevant vaccines, prescriptions, and other medical care; and

(iv) tracking rates of employee illness, recovery, and death.

(C) Criteria for determining the conditions that may warrant the integration of additional actions in the aviation screening system in response to the communicable disease outbreak and a range of potential roles and responsibilities that align with such conditions.

(D) Contingency plans for temporarily adjusting checkpoint operations to provide for passenger and employee safety while maintaining security during the communicable disease outbreak.

(E) Provisions setting forth criteria for establishing an interagency task force or other standing engagement platform with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Transportation, to address such communicable disease outbreak.

(F) A description of scenarios in which the Administrator should consider exercising authorities provided under subsection (g) and for what purposes.

(G) Considerations for assessing the appropriateness of issuing security directives and emergency amendments to regulated parties in various modes of transportation, including surface transportation, and plans for ensuring compliance with such measures.

(H) A description of any potential obstacles, including funding constraints and limitations to authorities, that could restrict the ability of the Administration to respond appropriately to a communicable disease outbreak.

(4) Dissemination – Upon development of the plan required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall disseminate the plan to the partners identified under paragraph (3)(A) and to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

(5) Review of plan – Not later than two years after the date on which the plan is disseminated under paragraph (4), and biennially thereafter, the Secretary, acting through the Administrator and in coordination with the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland Security, shall review the plan and, after consultation with the partners identified under paragraphs (3)(A)(i) through (3)(A)(iv), update the plan as appropriate.

(b) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date on which the transportation security preparedness plan required under subsection (x) of section 114 of title 49, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), is disseminated under paragraph (4) of such subsection (x), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report containing the results of a study assessing the transportation security preparedness plan, including an analysis of—

- (1) whether such plan aligns with relevant Federal plans and strategies for communicable disease outbreaks; and
- (2) the extent to which the Transportation Security Administration is prepared to implement the plan.



2.0 INTRODUCTION

This *Transportation Security Preparedness Plan to Address the Event of a Communicable Disease* provides guidance to communicate and collaborate across the Nation's transportation sector and to protect its workforce and the traveling public. The goal of this plan is to minimize disruptions in the transportation sector in advance of or immediately following a communicable disease outbreak. This plan applies to all agencies, partners, and stakeholders, including the private sector, that support or help shape the Nation's transportation security system. The plan addresses the preparations the sector has taken to lessen the impact of a communicable disease outbreak by developing, employing, and coordinating core preparedness capabilities to reduce the impact to the transportation sector.³

"Communicable diseases are illnesses that spread from one person to another or from an animal to a person. Some of the ways they may spread are through direct contact with a sick person, breathing in airborne viruses and bacteria, contact with blood and other body fluids, contact with a contaminated surface or object, or bites from insects or animals that can transmit the disease."

CDC, The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)

This plan recognizes that success relies upon a whole of community approach and depends on collaboration and communication before the onset of any incident including a communicable disease. It outlines the preparation efforts of the transportation security system, while acknowledging that other departments and agencies may have similar existing plans, protocols, or standard operating procedures. It also aligns with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF), while incorporating aspects from other guiding federal documents and plans, such as Federal Interagency Operational Plans and presidential directives (such as National Security Memoranda and Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs)).

DHS is comprised of eight operational components, including TSA, that conduct front-line counterterrorism, law enforcement, cybersecurity, prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and response operations to support DHS missions. The other headquarters offices and directorates offer policies, plans, crucial mission support resources, intelligence and analysis, outreach, and public-private sector collaboration that facilitate mission execution.

PPD 44, Enhancing Domestic Incident Response, was signed on November 7, 2016. In addition to providing the process to name an LFA for domestic incidents, the PPD tasked relevant federal departments to ensure the availability of appropriate incident management support capabilities, which, in the context of a communicable disease outbreak, may include:

³ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Mitigation Federal Interagency Operational Plan p.1.

- The designation of domestic incident response leadership.
- Execution of federally led response activities outside of the authorities established under the Stafford Act.⁴
- The implementation of a Unified Coordination Group (UCG) when there is the potential for physical consequences and infrastructure disruptions.
- Alignment of state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT), and private sector partners with communicable disease response and recovery activities within existing national preparedness goals and response frameworks.

The initial stages of a communicable disease outbreak will require interagency coordination before the designation of an LFA. The *Public Health Service Act* (PHSA) directs HHS to lead all federal public health and medical responses during public health emergencies. TSA will assist the LFA in communicating and collaborating with transportation sector federal, local, international, and private sector partners to establish necessary changes to security operations and ensure the safety of the TSA workforce and the traveling public.

2.1 Purpose

The purpose of this plan is to support the protection and safety of TSA's workforce and mission in the event of a communicable disease outbreak through active communication and collaboration across the transportation security system.

2.2 Objectives

Specific objectives include:

- Satisfy the requirements of section 6412 from the FY 2022 NDAA.
- Achieve the DHS Secretary's intent using an active and layered concept of emergency operations that incorporates existing business processes for incident management.⁵
- Maintain the traveling public's confidence in the Nation's transportation system.

2.2.1 Communicate and collaborate with transportation sector stakeholders:

- Support federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (FSLTT) governments and stakeholder efforts to mitigate the spread of a communicable disease, consistent with existing authorities.
- Ensure effective communication to support coordination of resources and protect the workforce, while maintaining the ability to address other threats to the transportation sector.
- Be prepared to assist transportation partners and stakeholders to enhance the safety and security of the Nation's transportation system. Use current engagement platforms

⁴ FEMA, in part relying on authorities under the Stafford Act, coordinates management and oversight responsibilities for administrative and logistics requirements that support response and short-term recovery operations, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_stafford_act_2021_vol1.pdf.

⁵ DHS Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Disease Workforce Protection Plan (PEIDWPP), 2022, page 8.

to address the transportation sector's concerns in an integrated and collaborative manner.

2.2.2 Protect the safety of the TSA workforce.

- Protect against a communicable disease outbreak that threatens the health and safety of the TSA workforce and persons in federal care and custody by incorporating DHS's three proven lines of defense against communicable diseases:
 - Good public and personal health and hygiene practices (like cover coughs and sneezes, wash hands frequently, use alcohol-based hand sanitizer, get up to date with vaccines, wear a mask in crowded or poorly ventilated indoor areas, and don't travel while sick).
 - Workplace controls, including engineering and administrative controls (such as social distancing, barriers, telework, and other workforce flexibilities) and use of personal protective equipment (PPE).
 - Medical countermeasures (MCMs) for the disease-causing agent (for example, medications or vaccines) used in accordance with DHS guidelines and other federal interagency programs, establish a mechanism to prioritize and provide appropriate MCMs to the workforce.
- Execute workforce and workplace protective measures (PPE wear, social distancing, telework/remote work, temporary duty assignments, etc.) to ensure the continuation of essential support functions.
- Provide the workforce and their families with assistance and support as necessary, within the scope of statutory provisions and policies.
- Gather and report on workforce absenteeism, illness, recovery, and death.
- Adjust checkpoint operations, using currently recommended personnel protective actions and technologies, while ensuring the continued protection of the workforce and traveling public.

2.2.3 Ensure compliance with federal regulations.

- Identify and monitor federal laws, rules, and regulations that should be modified to better protect the workforce and facilities during preparedness and response to a communicable disease. Use existing authorities in response to a communicable disease outbreak such as TSA's authority under 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2) to issue new or revised Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs).⁶
- Work with foreign and domestic carriers, along with relevant federal agencies, to consider and issue new or revised SDs and EAs.⁷

⁶ GAO *TSA Efforts to Coordinate with Stakeholders on COVID-19 Security Directives*, p.1.

⁷ Ibid.

2.2.4 Ensure the capability to accomplish TSA's mission essential functions.⁸

- Safeguard mission essential personnel performing critical transportation security duties as part of their core job requirements.
- Execute Continuity of Operations (COOP) and devolution⁹ plans, as needed.

2.3 Scope

The plan integrates relevant requirements from the DHS Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Disease Workforce Protection Plan, as well as those from other federal authorities such as HHS and the CDC. This is accomplished by:

- Supporting and advising the LFA on transportation security-specific factors.
- Incorporating NIMS-established guidance to maintain a high level of readiness.
- Communicating and collaborating with FSLTT governments, transportation sector partners and stakeholders, international agencies, and workforce representatives.
- Understanding stakeholder functions, as well as information sharing and collaboration methods.
- Ensuring appropriate workplace controls, processes, and technologies are in place to safeguard the workforce.¹⁰
- Providing risk analyses and a response concept of operations.¹¹

The plan addresses actions to be taken to mitigate a communicable disease outbreak that could impact the Nation's transportation sector, while supporting the LFA in its whole-of-government response. Further, actions described in it may take place with or without a PHE declaration by the Secretary of HHS. Mission planning and operations associated with it in no way replace or supersede existing statutes and regulations of other agencies, which remain in effect, as well as relevant directives, instructions, and agreements. This plan supplements existing plans and bridges the gap between traditional all-hazards continuity planning and the specialized continuity planning required for a communicable disease outbreak.

⁸ TSA Mission Essential Functions (MEFs): 1) Conduct risk-based transportation security screening operations and assist other federal partners and state and local law enforcement to provide detection of and a visible deterrent against potential terrorist actions; 2) Manage the risk-based transportation security watch list and vetting processes; 3) Provide on-board transportation security; 4) Develop and share intelligence-driven risk-based security, counterterrorism, and response procedures, systems, and situational awareness information and guidance with key domestic and international government and private sector stakeholders to enhance the security and resilience of the Nation's transportation system; 5) Coordinate aviation access and egress within, and prevent or respond to violations of, the restricted airspace over the National Capital Region (NCR) and around Camp David, Maryland.

⁹ DHS FEMA Federal Continuity Directive 1 *Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program and Requirements*. January 2017. p.8.

¹⁰ The term workforce includes contractors and persons in an agency's care and custody, as well as working and service animals.

¹¹ TSA's role in a response is not as a first responder. For the purpose of this Plan, the term respond (or response) refers to actions taken by TSA to assist personnel and stakeholders in the execution of its mission essential functions.

2.4 Facts and Assumptions

The facts and assumptions introduced below were used in developing this plan:

- Communicable disease outbreaks will likely extend across multiple jurisdictions and involve all transportation modes.
- Health and medical advisories issued by the U.S. government will include recommendations and guidance based on the latest scientific, health, and medical information.
- A communicable disease outbreak may result in loss of passenger throughput, increased workforce absenteeism due to illness, temporary reassignments, and potentially permanent loss of workforce members.

2.4.1 Communicate and collaborate with transportation sector stakeholders.

- Before and during a communicable disease outbreak, TSA will communicate and collaborate with transportation stakeholders and the traveling public.
- The Biological Incident Notification and Assessment (BINA) Protocol is a process that allows the Federal Government the ability to rapidly develop a common understanding of an evolving, potentially high-consequence biological incident or threat, allowing for rapid decision-making and coordinated action among agencies and as directed by the President..¹²
 - DHS will then notify components, as needed.
- TSA will provide the traveling public with information on the latest CDC-directed safety protocols through a public-facing website and social media platforms.
- TSA's support to the UCG will be through its Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) or Critical Incident Management Group (CIMG).
- TSA will use its communication engagement platforms (see Appendix 1) to share appropriate transportation-related information and workforce protection preparedness activities addressing impacts from communicable disease outbreaks.
- The LFA will establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) to ensure unity of communications through a single federal spokesperson.
- Executive-level actions from the White House and requirements from the HHS and DHS Secretaries, or the UCG Senior Response Official, may result in TSA issuing SDs and EAs.
 - TSA, acting under its own authorities, may issue SDs or EAs, or other guidance documents (like Information Bulletins) to its stakeholders.
 - TSA regularly consults with relevant federal agencies (such as the CDC) on the issuance of those authorities.

¹² *Key Planning Factors and Considerations for Response to and Recovery from a Biological Incident, 2022*, Appendix A; page 156.

2.4.2 Protect the safety of the TSA workforce.

- Before and during a communicable disease outbreak, TSA will take all necessary steps to protect the workforce and may consult with the DHS OHS, in particular the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), as needed.
- Contact tracing may be implemented to identify potential exposures and at-risk individuals, including exposures in the workplace.
- Workplace controls (for example, adding acrylic barriers and enhanced cleaning of high-touch surfaces at airport screening checkpoints) will be adopted to limit and reduce exposure, transmission, and illness.
- TSA will convey workforce protection measures, based on CDC, Department of Labor (DOL), the Safer Federal Workforce Taskforce¹³, and other relevant guidance, with its transportation sector partners and stakeholders.
- Screening checkpoints may need to be adjusted using recommended personnel protective actions and technologies to protect the workforce and traveling public while adhering to all security processes and procedures.
 - The Infection Control Monitor (ICM) (see Section 5.2, Adaptive Risk Management) may be used at airport screening checkpoints to reduce the spread of a communicable disease for both the workforce and the traveling public.
- Depending on the nature of the communicable disease, appropriate PPE may be needed to help infection control efforts for the workforce.
- PPE planning will be consistent with occupational safety, health, and respiratory protection programs, including appropriate training on assigned PPE.
- Risk assessments for each task performed by the workforce will have been conducted before an event, coordinated with the AFGE, and updated as needed. PPE requirements are defined by these risk assessments.
- Sufficient supplies of PPE will be available in most cases; however, sustained operations and supply chain issues may result in resupply delays.¹⁴
- Vaccines and medication for commonly encountered communicable diseases will be available to the workforce consistent with applicable guidance in an appropriate and equitable method.
- Agency distribution of unapproved MCMs that meet certain criteria may be authorized through an emergency use authorization. These authorizations permit the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner to allow the use of an unapproved medical product or the unapproved use of an approved medical product by non-medical personnel.
- TSA Point of Dispensing (POD) plans provide for the dispensing of antibiotics and other MCMs; but not for vaccine distribution, which requires a higher level of logistics and planning, including cold chain (managing storage temperatures) management.

¹³ <https://www.saferfederalworkforce.gov/>.

¹⁴ FEMA, Biological Incident Annex (BIA), FIOP, C-14.

- COOP and devolution plans may be implemented.
 - The DHS Continuity Mission Assurance Board serves as the integrated DHS-wide, senior-level forum and governance body to address organizational continuity issues and strategy. It also addresses DHS's implementation of continuity policy and programs, including continuity of government, devolution, and reconstitution activities. The DHS Continuity Working Group, chaired by the DHS Continuity Manager or designee, coordinates information sharing, planning, and operations needed to facilitate the integration of continuity activities within the department.

2.5 Tasks and Key Considerations

This plan will be relevant in ensuring all aspects of the transportation security system are considered, including the following:

- Protect the transportation system sector workforce and the traveling public.
- Conduct research and adopt relevant technologies and resources.
- Maintain public trust in the health, safety, and security of the transportation sector.
- Maintain a public-facing website that incorporates transportation security-specific information for the traveling public, stakeholders, and the workforce on current travel advisories and precautionary measures to take.
- Communicate and collaborate early and often with FSLTT government partners, international partners, aviation and surface transportation stakeholders, and TSA's exclusive workforce representatives – the AFGE.
- Ensure all internal and external public messaging is accurate, timely, accessible, and authoritative while coordinating with transportation sector stakeholders and partners.
- Establish and maintain situational awareness.
- Define risk acceptance and conduct risk assessments, analyses, and updates as required.
- Execute risk management actions to minimize impacts on the transportation sector.
- Fulfill all reporting requirements from the LFA, DHS, and other collaboration platforms (task force or working group).¹⁵
- Respond to requests for information and requests for assistance.
- Identify and report any gaps in funding, staffing, or resources to appropriate officials.
- Participate in transportation sector working groups and provide representation to transportation sector task forces.
- Monitor workforce absenteeism, infections, and deaths; and report as directed.

¹⁵ Task force is defined as “any combination of resources assembled to support a specific mission or operational need.” *ICS Organizational Structure and Elements – ICS 300*, March 2018, p. 3.

- Modify operations and Human Capital (HC) measures (such as, telework, leave usage, and other workforce flexibilities) to accommodate workforce protections while maintaining TSA mission essential functions.



3.0 COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION

Presidential Policy Directive-21 designates DHS and DOT as Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) for the Transportation Systems Sector (TSS). DHS delegated its co-SRMA responsibilities to TSA and the United States Coast Guard. The FY 2021 NDAA codifies SRMAs (previously known as Sector Specific Agencies) and defines how they work with DHS to protect critical infrastructure.

The TSS consists of seven key subsectors or modes: aviation, freight rail, highway and motor carrier, maritime, mass transit and passenger rail, pipeline systems, and postal and shipping. The transportation sector and its subsectors are supported by a partnership model that includes both government and industry stakeholders. Within this model, SRMAs, Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) and corresponding Government Coordinating Councils (GCC) support information sharing and incident response coordination and collaboration activities.¹⁶

Communication, collaboration, and coordination are the most critical components of any preparedness and response effort when so many stakeholders from different transportation sectors are involved. Participation by the whole-of-government and the whole-of-society¹⁷ requires equal access to national preparedness activities and programs. Collaborative discussions on communicable disease prevention and response should focus on the following areas:

- Identifying communications systems for public officials to deliver consistent, unified, and coordinated messaging that is credible and provides clear, timely, and actionable information that is accessible and culturally and linguistically appropriate for all affected populations.¹⁸
- Ensuring messaging adheres to the principles of crisis and risk communications, even in areas unaffected by the incident, and includes information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken, and the assistance being made available.¹⁹
- Sharing Sensitive but Unclassified information with FSLTT, international and private sector partners using the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).²⁰

Because multiple federal agencies support preparedness and response, sharing current and accurate information across the Federal Government with transportation sector partners and stakeholders is critical to coordinating federal teams and assets. Without a defined interagency platform, TSA would establish a transportation security task force to respond to a specific communicable disease outbreak. Members would include key federal partners such as HHS, DHS OHS, DOT, DOL, and other relevant transportation security stakeholders to address those issues specific to the outbreak.

¹⁶ *Transportation Systems Sector Response Playbook*, 2021, p. 5. (DRAFT).

¹⁷ *National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security*, Goal 4, Section 4.1, page xviii.

¹⁸ Emergency Support Function 15, *Standard Operating Procedures*, July 2019, p. 10.

¹⁹ HHS/CDC, *Crisis Emergency & Risk Communication, Second Edition*, 2014, p. 2.

²⁰ HSIN <https://www.dhs.gov/what-hsin>.

3.1 Threat Notification

Identification and notification of a communicable disease that could impact the Nation's transportation security system could come from a variety of sources. Health monitoring systems and organizations across all levels of government and the private sector, both domestic and international, could provide notice of a communicable disease threat. Those sources include various CDC surveillance systems, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Health Alert Network, Clinician Outreach and Communication Activity, and more.²¹

Once a high-consequence threat is recognized, the identifying U.S. agency will notify the National Security Council (NSC) and request activation of the BINA Protocol.²²

- The BINA Protocol will convene a meeting with all department and agency operations centers and/or deputies to discuss the threat and actions that each should take.
- Departments and agencies, using their standing authorities, should immediately take appropriate protective actions to safeguard their missions and their workforce while awaiting further guidance.
- Within DHS, the OHS will determine and distribute workforce protection guidelines to all DHS components, including TSA.

Following completion of the BINA Protocol, all future communication and collaboration between TSA and its TSS partners should be conducted using the engagement platforms listed in Appendix 1.

The NSC and the LFA drive unity of effort and messaging through the JIC, which is critical to ensuring unity of communications through a single federal spokesperson.²³ The DHS OHS, led by the CMO, unifies the Department's medical, workforce health and safety, and public health functions under one organization. While DHS OHS coordinates DHS-wide efforts and ensures appropriate oversight, components like TSA maintain their operational authorities.

The appropriate spokesperson for a communicable disease outbreak may be from HHS, DHS²⁴, the NSC, SLTT, or elsewhere, in accordance with applicable Presidential Policy Directives. The National Incident Coordination Conference Line, State Incident Coordination Conference Line, and Private-sector Incident Coordination Conference Line serve as capabilities for communicating and providing guidance for the government and the community, including the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and the traveling public.

²¹ FEMA, BIA FIOP, p. B-3.

²² Ibid, p. B-5.

²³ FEMA, BIA FIOP, p. 9.

²⁴ The DHS Office of Public Affairs coordinates the public affairs activities of all of the Department's components and offices, and serves as the federal government's lead public information office during a national emergency or disaster.

Joint Information Center

The early establishment of a JIC is critical for coordinating risk communications through a single federal spokesperson. Unless otherwise directed, the applicable PPDs designate the following roles:

- HHS Secretary or designee serves as the primary spokesperson for public health and medical response, aided by subject matter experts within the department and White House guidance.
- Secretary of DHS through the national JIC (where HHS has public affairs representation) coordinates federal response-related announcements to the public.
- HHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA) assumes the lead in media response for public health, coordinated with the JIC.
- HHS/Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) may designate one of the HHS agencies to take the lead on public affairs activities with the responsibility of consulting with HHS ASPR.
- DHS National Operations Center provides direct support through situational awareness, information sharing, and executive communications, in incidents where the DHS National JIC is activated.

3.2 Partner and Stakeholder Communication and Collaboration

Keeping all transportation sector stakeholders informed is critical. Providing them with accurate, timely information can help alleviate anxiety, avoid unnecessary disruption and economic losses, and support public confidence.²⁵ Authoritative communication and collaboration also helps minimize inaccurate information or disinformation.²⁶ While TSA's role is to ensure security is not compromised during a communicable disease outbreak, accurate, timely, and informed communication and collaboration are the responsibilities of all transportation system stakeholders. Effective protection or response relies on providing the stakeholders at greatest risk with real-time or near-real-time alerts of emerging or breaking events.

3.3 Domestic Industry and Government Stakeholder Communication and Collaboration

As an SRMA partner within the Transportation Systems Sector, TSA will serve as a connector and information sharing source during a communicable disease outbreak. As such, TSA may initiate and potentially lead sector coordination calls that affect the security of airlines, airports, or other transportation modes. TSA will share and integrate GCC/SCC information into government response briefings, discussions, and documents through the appropriate channels

²⁵ GAO *Air travel and Communicable Diseases*. p.35.

²⁶ NIH *Travel Restrictions and Infectious Disease Outbreaks*. 2020. p.8.

(like Emergency Support Function (ESF) #1, Transportation). SRMA representatives rely on SCC partners for subject-matter expertise and strategic information on needs, concerns, and impacts. TSA will work to amplify and address private sector concerns wherever possible and will facilitate communication with federal response agencies when needed by clarifying available routing mechanisms.²⁷

Led by the SRMA partners, TSS Coordination Calls will provide information on the communicable disease outbreak and its effect on infrastructure. They will also seek information on sector shortfalls, requirements, actions, and concerns. Private sector partners will be encouraged to look first to their state and local governments for information and assistance, as the call is not intended to replace other federal or state coordination mechanisms.²⁸ During a communicable disease outbreak, TSA will regularly communicate with stakeholder partners (government and private sector) and share protective actions recommended by CDC, DOL, and the Safer Federal Workforce Taskforce using platforms such as websites, teleconferences, HSIN, etc. For additional examples, please see Appendix 1.

TSA, through its Industry Engagement Managers and Principal Security Specialists, works with hundreds of surface and aviation industry stakeholders and operators, other TSA partners, as well as other federal agencies to develop and manage transportation security policies and programs based on evolving threats. During COVID-19, TSA served as the primary engagement lead between federal entities (CDC, DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), DHS OHS, the White House Coronavirus Task Force, etc.) and numerous airline, airport, and surface transportation associations to share important information on mask mandates and vaccine requirements and to work through challenges those requirements placed upon the Transportation Systems Sector.

3.4 International Security Partner Communication and Collaboration

The United States engages in several international partnerships on preparedness and response for communicable diseases. In the event a communicable disease involves a possible outbreak, the WHO will, if requested by national authorities, collaborate by assessing the effectiveness of control measures in place. It will also, upon request, collaborate in the provision or facilitation of technical cooperation and logistical support.²⁹ International partners may also request information or assistance from the United States, or the United States may request information or assistance from international partners.³⁰

TSA develops and promotes the implementation of effective or enhanced global aviation and transportation security processes and structures worldwide, while ensuring compliance with international and TSA standards. Through its Regional Desk Officers and Transportation Security Administration Representatives (TSARs), TSA routinely engages with international governments and transportation partners. Further, the International Industry Representatives

²⁷ *Transportation Systems Sector Response Playbook, 2021*, p.6. (DRAFT).

²⁸ *Transportation Systems Sector Response Playbook, 2021*, p. 11. (DRAFT).

²⁹ WHO *Tuberculosis and Air Travel: Guidelines for Prevention and Control*. 2013. p. 23.

³⁰ FEMA, BIA FIOP, p. 8.

serve as the principal TSA air carrier liaisons and points of contact for affected air carriers throughout a crisis response and incident management period.

TSA will leverage its relationship with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to ensure collaboration with international partners and stakeholders. ICAO serves as the global forum of States for international civil aviation. It develops policies and standards, undertakes compliance audits, performs studies and analyses, provides assistance, and builds aviation capacity through many other activities and with the cooperation of its member States and stakeholders.³¹ The Collaborative Arrangement for the Prevention and Management of Public Health Events in Civil Aviation (CAPSCA) is a standing group within ICAO that focuses on global health issues. It brings together international, regional, national, and local organizations to combine efforts to improve preparedness planning and response to public health events that affect the aviation sector.³² Of note, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ICAO established the Council Aviation Recovery Task Force, to support a global approach to the specific health issues affecting aviation.

3.5 Communication with the TSA Workforce

TSA leadership engages with its workforce in a variety of ways, which includes shift briefs, virtual and in-person town halls, conference calls, social media postings, televised updates/briefings, reoccurring advisory memos, TSA Broadcast e-mails, TSA News App, and use of the TSA iShare page. If urgent communication with the workforce is required, TSA leadership can use the Alert Warning System to pass along messages and account for its workforce; along with phone calls, texts, and e-mail. As needed, messages will include relevant information from the CDC and the DHS OHS.

Within the airport environment, the TSO is the face of the TSA workforce during a communicable disease outbreak when it comes to daily engagement with the traveling public. Ensuring the workforce is provided with timely, accessible, and accurate information on the situation bolsters confidence in the workforce and, through that, confidence in the federal response. TSA leadership should ensure that the workforce is continuously updated on policies and procedures through all appropriate means while establishing a platform to address concerns.

TSA and the AFGE, which represents the TSO workforce, should be engaged whenever workforce and workplace processes and procedures (consistent with TSA Administrator's Determination on Collective Bargaining for Transportation Security Officers, 2022) and any collective bargaining agreements are affected.

TSA's HC provides services and responsive solutions for the well-being of the TSA community. The HC office can use Human Capital Advisory Memos (HCAMs) to update and modify guidance to support and protect the TSA workforce.

3.6 Public Outreach

Delivering consistent, authoritative messaging that is credible and provides clear, timely, and actionable information is critical. Public information must be accessible to people with

³¹ <https://www.icao.int/about-icao/Council/Pages/vision-and-mission.aspx>.

³² <https://www.icao.int/safety/CAPSCA/Pages/About-CAPSCA.aspx>.

disabilities (such as people who are deaf or hard of hearing and people who are blind or have low vision) and provided in languages other than English in order to reach people who are limited English proficient. In addition, providing information that is accessible and culturally and linguistically appropriate for all affected populations enhances the traveling public's trust and confidence in the federal response.

The HHS Secretary or designee serves as the primary spokesperson for public health and medical response, aided by subject matter experts within the Department and by White House guidance. DHS response-related announcements to the public are coordinated by the Secretary, through the national JIC, where HHS has public affairs representation. All TSA messaging will be coordinated through the JIC to ensure it is accurate, timely, and consistent with national messaging.



TSA builds public trust in and understanding of its mission, policies, and initiatives by strategically communicating with internal and external audiences in a timely, accurate, and transparent way. SCPA manages the agency's strategic communications, TSA's website, media outreach, and social media platforms, including the @AskTSA program, which responds to travelers' queries on Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and via SMS text.

Beyond the checkpoint environment, TSA's "Stay Healthy. Stay Secure." campaign builds on the checkpoint communications to provide passengers with information outside the checkpoint space.³³ TSA also shares information with the public through the TSA Contact Center and through the TSA Disability and Multicultural Coalition. Additionally, DOT maintains the flyhealthy.gov website, which acts as a collaborative source of interagency information for passengers.

³³ Runway to Recovery: The United States Framework for Airlines and Airports to Mitigate the Public Health Risks of Coronavirus. V1.1. December, 2020. p. 39.

4.0 SECURITY DIRECTIVES AND EMERGENCY AMENDMENTS

Under its statutory authority (49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2)), TSA can impose mandatory measures if the TSA Administrator determines that a regulation or Security Directive (SD) must be issued immediately to protect transportation security. The TSA Administrator issues the regulation or directive without providing notice or an opportunity for comment and without prior approval of the DHS Secretary. Regulations or SDs issued under this authority must be ratified by the Transportation Security Oversight Board (TSOB) to remain effective beyond 90 days.³⁴ TSA can issue SDs to impose mandatory security measures on a regulated party in the aviation sector under applicable provisions of TSA regulations and the U.S. Code when TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary to respond to a threat assessment or a specific threat to civil aviation.³⁵

TSA SDs issued to foreign air carriers³⁶ are referred to as Emergency Amendments (EA). EAs for foreign air carriers impose mandatory security measures, comparable to an SD. SDs are issued when additional security measures are necessary to respond to a threat assessment or a specific threat to civil aviation. TSA issues an EA to a foreign air carrier when an emergency requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air transportation makes notice and comment procedures contrary to the public interest.³⁷

Domestic air carriers are responsible for implementing TSA security requirements predominantly through TSA-approved security programs. These programs describe the policies, procedures, and systems that the air carriers are to implement and maintain to comply with those security requirements. TSA may only issue an EA under 49 CFR §§ 1542.105(d), 1544.105(d), 1546.105(d), 1548.7(e), and 1549.7(e) to a security program if the Agency determines that an emergency requiring immediate action makes notice and comment procedures contrary to safety and the public interest.³⁸

TSA may also issue SDs for surface transportation operators when necessary.³⁹ However, unlike the aviation environment, where TSA has operational responsibility for screening passengers and

³⁴ The TSOB was created by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) to provide guidance regarding transportation security-related matters. TSOB members include the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Transportation, Defense, and the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, or their designees, and one member appointed by the President to represent the NSC. The Secretary of Homeland Security serves in the role of TSOB chairman, which has been further delegated within the Department to the Deputy Secretary. The TSOB ratifies or disapproves any regulation or security directive issued by the TSA Administrator under 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2) within 30 days after the date of issuance of such regulation or directive. 49 U.S.C. §§ 115(a), 115(b)(1), 115(b)(2), 115(c).

³⁵ See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 114, 49 CFR §§ 1542.303 and 1542.305; see also TSA Management Directive 2100.5. *Process and Governance for Issuance and Revision of Transportation Security Policy*. March 8, 2021.

³⁶ A “foreign air carrier” is defined by 49 U.S.C. § 40102(21) as “a person, not a citizen of the United States, undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide foreign air transportation.

³⁷ 49 CFR § 1546.105(d).

³⁸ TSA Management Directive 2100.5. *Process and Governance for Issuance and Revision of Transportation Security Policy*. March 8, 2021.

³⁹ 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2).

baggage, the agency has a limited operational role for securing the surface transportation system.⁴⁰

In developing transportation security policy, following the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016⁴¹ and the TSA Modernization Act (2018)⁴², TSA will consult with key regulated and other potentially affected parties, including industry associations and international organizations, when possible.⁴³ TSA also coordinates with DHS (including Customs and Border Protection (CBP)), DOT, FAA, and the Department of State (DOS), depending upon the issue.

The goal of the consultation process is to ensure TSA and the various parties are sharing information and addressing concerns before TSA issues a new transportation security policy.⁴⁴ Whenever possible, TSA, working through its International Industry Representative and Principal Security Specialist workforce, will coordinate with domestic and foreign air carriers before issuing an SD or EA to ensure a collaborative approach to effective implementation of the mandatory security measures.

TSA SDs may be issued to provide enforcement support for, and should align directly with, relevant CDC orders. The CDC may also specify that TSA must enforce CDC's orders following applicable statutory and regulatory authorities, such as 49 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114, 44902, 44903, and 46301; and 49 C.F.R. part 1503, §§ 1540.105, 1542.303, 1544.305, and 1546.105.

TSA regularly conducts compliance inspections on those parties required to comply with TSA's regulations, also known as "regulated parties." TSA's Security Operations is responsible for supporting timely development of transportation security policy and ensuring effective compliance and inspection oversight.

Scenarios for issuing an SD or EA

In the event of a communicable disease, to carry out executive-level actions from the White House, requirements from the Secretary of Homeland Security, or TSA policy under its own authority, TSA may issue SDs and EAs. These SDs and EAs are developed in coordination with interagency partners (to include a UCG, if established) using approved processes and procedures.

⁴⁰ GAO *TSA Efforts to Coordinate with Stakeholders on COVID-19 Security Directives*. 2022. p. 2.

⁴¹ <https://www.congress.gov/bills/114/congress/house-bills/636/text>.

⁴² <https://www.congress.gov/bills/115/congress/senate-bills/1872/text>.

⁴³ Under the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, TSA must, in consultation with the appropriate regulated entities, conduct a comprehensive review of every security directive to determine whether each such security directive continues to be relevant; determine whether such security directive should be streamlined or consolidated to most efficiently maximize risk reduction; and update, consolidate, or revoke any security directive as necessary. Under section 1953 of the TSA Modernization Act, TSA must, to the maximum extent practicable, consult and notify certain specified stakeholders prior to making changes to security standards vis security directives and emergency amendments for last points of departure to the United States. The listed stakeholders are trade association representatives for affected air carriers and airports, who hold the appropriate security clearances, and the head of each relevant federal department or agency, including the FAA Administrator.

⁴⁴ TSA Management Directive 2100.5. *Process and Governance for Issuance and Revision of Transportation Security Policy*. March 8, 2021.

The scenarios presented below are not meant to be exclusive, but rather to illustrate when TSA might consider issuing an SD or EA.

Enforcement of the CDC Mask Mandate

On January 29, 2021, the CDC issued an order that required face masks to be worn by all people, with limited exceptions, while on public transportation (which included all passengers and all personnel operating conveyances) traveling into, within, or out of the United States and its territories. The order also required all people to wear face masks while at transportation hubs (airports, bus or ferry terminals, train and subway stations, seaports, U.S. ports of entry, and other locations where people board public transportation in the United States and U.S. territories), including both indoor and outdoor areas. TSA issued SDs and EAs to enforce this order.



Foreign Attestations

During COVID-19 response activities, TSA issued SDs and EAs to domestic and foreign air carriers, respectively, requiring them to collect attestations from non-citizen non-immigrant passengers traveling into the United States. The attestations were to affirm that these passengers had proof of being fully vaccinated against COVID-19, in support of *Advancing the Safe Resumption of Global Travel During the COVID-19 Pandemic*⁴⁵, a Presidential Proclamation, and CDC Order. TSA worked with its international aviation partners on the implementation of the EA to ensure those attestations would be securely retained following applicable laws.

⁴⁵ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/10/25/a-proclamation-on-advancing-the-safe-resumption-of-global-travel-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/>.

5.0 PROTECTING THE SAFETY OF THE TSA WORKFORCE

The Preparedness Operational Paradigm (Figure 1) serves as a common platform for ensuring that the Nation's transportation system sector's actions are coordinated to achieve the objectives of this plan and as a vehicle for synchronizing preparedness efforts for a communicable disease outbreak. This plan is always in effect, spans steady state and incident-driven environments, and focuses on the connections among preparedness core capabilities and the integration with other national planning frameworks, FIOPs, as well as other department and agency plans and procedures.

Preparedness core capabilities are delivered across multiple operational states on a continuing basis, including when an incident occurs. Core capabilities are mutually supportive; overlapping actions are seldom delivered in isolation. For effective mitigation to occur, understanding the connections among capabilities is as critical as understanding the internal disciplines and requirements of each capability.

Federal departments and agencies support whole community preparedness efforts by applying their own programs and capabilities across individual and coordinated operations, both in support of incidents and in response to risk. Mitigation is also supported and encouraged by regulatory obligations, supervisory powers, and responsibilities to assist and inform stakeholders.

Activities to support a culture of preparedness include:

- Expertise from subject matter experts;
- Engagement with stakeholders, the transportation workforce and the traveling public; and
- Training, outreach, and education (including stakeholder engagement, guidance, and exercises).

Figure 1: Preparedness Operational Paradigm



- **Preparedness/workforce protection.** Preparedness efforts conducted during steady state operations incorporate program management structures around shared goals and principles, department and agency initiatives, and coordinating structures to maximize and ensure continued federal performance.
- **Risk management.** Adaptive risk management applies to both steady-state preparation and response activities and offers opportunities for course correction within each. Models for preparation and response operations include identifying opportunities for continuous improvement. For instance, advances in technology create new and more accurate ways to assess and mitigate hazards, and federal preparedness action may change based on such advancements.
- **Response operations.** Response, as well as recovery, capabilities will be used following NIMS and the NRF.

5.1 Preparedness / Workforce Protection

The Nation's transportation sector conducts preparedness activities based on current and future risks, not solely in response to a communicable disease. Preparedness actions may be informally coordinated or bring together differing coordination structures and diverse program expertise, scientific knowledge, and authorities.⁴⁶ The greater the preparation for a communicable disease outbreak, the faster operations across the transportation system can return to normal.

The method to process information throughout incident management is continuous and fluid, allowing for optimal flexibility. These processes and their prescribed order of operations ensure appropriate situational awareness is maintained, assessments and analyses are applied, answers to RFAs and RFIs are coordinated, and recommended response actions occur in a timely, orderly, and effective manner.

Real-time monitoring for communicable diseases is essential to ensuring the United States is prepared to effectively respond to an outbreak. For example, real-time monitoring of COVID-19 spread became a critical tool in the United States' response to the pandemic, providing both decision makers and the general public with timely data. The National Bio-surveillance Integration Center within the DHS CWMD office tracked and consolidated global open-source reporting on COVID-19 trends, research, and epidemiology into daily reports for Congress, federal departments and agencies, and state and local public health partners. Also, within DHS, the Science and Technology Directorate broadened the focus of its Probabilistic Assessment of National Threats, Hazards, and Risks Program to include modeling and risk assessment of naturally occurring disease threats to the U.S. homeland.⁴⁷

Implementing health and medical guidance by using workplace controls must address all levels of risk and include geographic as well as pathogen-based factors to reduce disease occurrence. Safety and health assessments must be considered in terms of the mission, task, or activity. To

⁴⁶ Mitigation FIOP. p. 10.

⁴⁷ *First Annual Report on Progress Towards Implementation of the American Pandemic Preparedness Plan*, A Report by the White House Steering Committee for Pandemic Innovation of the National Science and Technology Council, Sept. 2022, p. 11.

that end, the DHS OHS will produce guidance that enables flexibility in implementing a layered approach to mitigate workplace exposures following the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Hierarchy of Controls, to include general PPE use.⁴⁸ The TSA Occupational Safety, Health, and Environment office and the TSA Office of the Chief Medical Officer (OCMO) will ensure that the guidance from DHS, CDC, DOL, and the Safer Federal Workforce Taskforce is optimized for the identified risk to the TSA workforce and mission.

When preparing for an outbreak, TSA will use its *Chemical, Biological, and Pandemic Response Base Plan* to direct its preparedness, response, and recovery activities, some of which are introduced below.

- Notify senior leadership, field components, and impacted staff of the communicable disease, and instruct staff to adopt the safety precautions suggested by HHS (such as social distancing, using appropriate PPE, etc.).
- Activate the TSA CIMG and support the LFA or UCG, if activated.
 - Develop mitigation security measures, to include SDs and EAs.
 - Support planning efforts for the transportation sector.
- Maintain situational awareness through routine communications with DHS National Operations Center, DHS OHS, HHS, DOT, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Response Coordination Center, if activated, as well as other operational components.
 - Place on alert or begin to deploy liaison officers to the LFA and other appropriate locations (such as DHS HQ, DHS OHS) as needed.
- Update workforce position risk assessments and the *TSA Communicable Disease Response Playbook*⁴⁹ to reflect issues specific to the communicable disease.
- Communicate with transportation stakeholder partners through standing engagement platforms (Appendix 1) to recommend the following actions:
 - Develop, review, and update incident response plans to include information related to the specifics of the communicable disease outbreak.
 - Conduct routine training, exercises, and drills with key FSLTT and industry partners.
 - Confirm adequate stocks of required PPE and MCMs are available and on hand and factor acquisition timelines and supply-chain limitations into incident response planning.
- Collaborate with international transportation stakeholders through standing engagement platforms, while being prepared to:

⁴⁸ DHS *PEIDWPP*, 2022, p. 6.

⁴⁹ In June 2020, TSA introduced the "*TSA Communicable Disease Response Playbook*," which consolidated all of TSA's best practices and recommendations for security checkpoints to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.

- Conduct global outreach and engagement to persuade international counterparts that effective mitigation measures are required to combat new and emerging threats.
- In partnership with DOT, engage with the ICAO and the CAPSCA.
- Provide support to DHS engagement working group/task forces to include DHS OHS, DHS CWMD, CBP, and others, when requested.
- Provide support to DOS engagement working group/task force, when requested.
- If the standing engagement platforms are not sufficient to support a particular communicable disease outbreak, TSA, DHS OHS, CBP, DHS CWMD, HHS, DOS, and DOT—along with other transportation stakeholders—should initiate a task force that can address those issues specific to the outbreak.
- Maintain message consistency to the workforce and traveling public through close and ongoing coordination with the JIC.

5.2 Adaptive Risk Management

Protecting the health and safety of the TSA workforce during communicable disease outbreaks is essential to ensuring the TSA mission. This process begins with a risk assessment, followed by implementing various mitigation strategies to protect the workforce. Controls and risk mitigation measures used in the transportation security system should continue to be consistent with, and supportive of, the broader set of community public health interventions recommended by the CDC.⁵⁰


Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations and guidance, as well as professional standards of occupational safety and health practice, require the use of a “hierarchy of controls” to reduce or eliminate workplace hazards. The hierarchy prioritizes controls based on the concept that the best way to control a hazard is to remove it from the workplace, and not rely on employees to take action to reduce exposure.

TSA control strategies follow the NIOSH Hierarchy of Controls (Figure 2) for risk management:

- First, by evaluating and applying, as feasible, workplace and engineering controls (such as ventilation; barriers; providing tissues, hand washing facilities, hand sanitizer, disinfectants, and disposable towels for employees to clean their work surfaces),
- Second, by using administrative controls (such as, but not limited to, social distancing, telework, shift modifications, duty-required or voluntary vaccine programs, employee awareness training/communications), and
- Third, by providing PPE.

⁵⁰ *Runway to Recovery: The United States Framework for Airlines and Airports to Mitigate the Public Health Risks of Coronavirus*. V1.1. December, 2020.

Figure 2. NIOSH Hierarchy of Controls



Elimination and substitution can be the most difficult actions to adopt into an existing process. These methods are best used at the design or development stage of a work process, place, or tool. At the development stage, elimination and substitution may be the simplest and cheapest option. Another good opportunity to use elimination and substitution is when selecting new equipment or procedures.⁵¹

Engineering controls reduce or prevent hazards from coming into contact with workers. Engineering controls can include modifying equipment or the workspace, using protective barriers, ventilation, and more. The NIOSH Engineering Controls Database has examples of published engineering control research findings.⁵² An example of an engineering control that TSA implemented at airports in response to COVID-19 was the installation of acrylic shield barriers at the travel and document checker positions, X-ray machine positions, and secondary bag check positions. These barriers, covering from the waist to above the head, helped protect both the traveling public and TSOs from spread of the disease.

Screening Checkpoints, Operations, and Additional Actions

In June 2020, TSA introduced the “TSA Communicable Disease Response Playbook,” consolidating and directing the implementation of TSA’s best practices and recommendations for security checkpoints to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. This playbook is designed to maximize protection of the workforce, minimize the transmission of the disease between and among the traveling public, and ultimately support the transportation sector so TSA can continue to perform its security mission.

⁵¹ <https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/hierarchy/default.html>.

⁵² Ibid.

Infection Control Monitor (ICM)

TSA officials may activate the ICM position at their respective locations in consultation with TSA senior leadership during response activities where PPE and social distancing efforts are used to protect the workforce, technologies, and the traveling public. Throughout each shift, the ICM is responsible for completing a checklist that requires confirming whether each of the procedures identified on the checklist is being implemented correctly and, if not, listing the corrective actions taken.

These checklists are then forwarded to their Occupational Safety and Health Official for any necessary local follow-up action. The function of the ICM is to support the safety and well-being of the workforce and the traveling public during a communicable disease outbreak. Duties of the ICM should include:

- Providing the screening checkpoint workforce and traveling public with reminders about appropriate physical distancing and how to appropriately wear PPE;
- Confirming PPE, cleaning supplies, and staff are prepared at the beginning of every shift;
- Ensuring that infection control procedures and PPE are followed by both the workforce and the traveling public, and providing constructive feedback; and
- Presenting recommendations and lessons learned to leadership to enhance compliance and modify checkpoint operations to support health and safety for all.

Protective actions include adjusting checkpoint operations by separating security checkpoint lines, installing protective barriers, implementing social distancing expectations for the traveling public, and using airport signage to emphasize good public and personal health and hygiene practices. Criteria for determining the implementation of actions will be based on guidance from, and in coordination with, the CDC – as it was during COVID-19 response. Actions are likely to vary depending on the nature of the communicable disease.

Through the implementation of the Response Playbook, TSA quickened its efforts to provide a lower-touch screening experience at airport security checkpoints. As a result, the screening process was made safer for both passengers and the TSA workforce. In response to future communicable disease outbreaks, TSA would rapidly tailor its Response Playbook by incorporating required or recommended changes to its screening checkpoint operations and its workforce protection efforts.

Administrative Actions

Administrative actions provided in human capital policy or guidance documents are designed to support and provide flexibility to the workforce within the authorities given to the TSA Administrator. Documents may detail how leave can be used or adjusted, the use and wear of

PPE, etc. During a communicable disease outbreak, HC would support the workforce by developing new or modifying current guidance. Updates may include, but are not limited to:

- Flexible leave usage
- Expanding telework
- Contact tracing
- Return to work plans

Example of Return to Work – mpox (formerly monkeypox)

The CDC advised that individuals with mpox should isolate until the rash has fully resolved, the scabs have fallen off, and a fresh layer of intact skin has formed. The duration of isolation is typically 3-4 weeks if a diagnosis of mpox is confirmed. Before returning an employee with a possible or confirmed case of mpox to the workplace, TSA management must:

- For confirmed cases: Receive documentation from the local health authority indicating the employee's isolation period has ended and obtain clearance from TSA OCMO. Clearance will be obtained from the Law Enforcement /Federal Air Marshal Service (LE/FAMS) Medical Programs Section for Federal Air Marshals.
- For possible cases: Obtain clearance from TSA OCMO or LE/FAMS Medical Programs Division for Federal Air Marshals.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

On a daily basis, the TSA front line workforce use PPE as part of a layered approach to protect themselves from the spread of communicable diseases. PPE items include nitrile gloves, surgical masks, respirators, splash goggles, and protective clothing (such as gowns and coveralls). TSA may direct the use of other specialty PPE items to mitigate unique situations. There are many classifications for PPE including those designed for operational use or prevention against a communicable disease exposure or biological attack. Operational PPE are items used, under routine or steady-state conditions, by the transportation security workforce having direct contact with the public.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, and based on consultation with DHS and CDC and guidance from the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force, TSA mandated the use of face masks by its workforce. This mandate allowed TSA to continue to perform its mission-essential functions and to minimize the spread of the coronavirus among the TSA workforce and the traveling public.

Medical Countermeasures (MCMs)

A key tenet of DHS's workforce protection is the provision of MCMs – therapeutics and vaccines – to exposed or potentially exposed personnel, at the direction of the DHS Secretary. TSA PODs are authorized to dispense specific antibiotics and approved MCMs – not vaccines. Should vaccines become available in sufficient quantities, the DHS MCMs program would need

to issue guidance on the use of PODs as authorized vaccination sites and provide the professional medical resources to administer them.

To ensure that MCMs can be disbursed quickly and equitably, TSA pre-positions authorized MCMs to be dispensed via PODs to the workforce and those in its care. For current stockpiles, an emergency use authorization has been approved. This permits MCMs to be stored and distributed via PODs without on-site medical presence at DHS locations. MCMs storage locations are accessible to the workforce 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and 365 days a year via PODs. Additionally, working canines and public service/assistance animals used by the workforce are included in TSA's MCMs planning processes.

Outside of the DHS MCMs program, TSA's workforce is dependent on its FSLTT partners to provide the resources and access to vaccines and other authorized MCMs to combat a specific communicable disease outbreak. For example, DHS partnered with the Veteran's Administration to provide its front-line and mission essential personnel access to the initial series of the COVID-19 vaccine through Veterans Affairs hospitals and clinics across the Nation.

5.3 Response and Recovery

Upon the identification of a communicable disease that threatens the United States and the Nation's transportation sector, response and recovery activities will be initiated. They will be coordinated through a unified interagency effort subject to the administration and implementation of the NRF, the National Disaster Recovery Framework, or associated response and recovery plans, all of which follow the NIMS. Once this occurs, priorities shift from building partnerships and capabilities to employing the resources needed to protect and save lives, safeguard property, and ensure the resiliency of operations within the transportation sector.

The following section of the plan introduces TSA's efforts for response and briefly discusses recovery. It is intended to be scalable, flexible, and adaptable throughout the evolution of a communicable disease outbreak. As the outbreak stabilizes, response efforts must be flexible to facilitate the integration of recovery activities.⁵³ Initial response activities may occur at any time following the identification of a communicable disease outbreak.

Activation and Situational Assessment

These actions begin when a communicable disease outbreak requires the coordination of multiple agencies, necessitating the development and implementation of a containment strategy and mitigating and responding actions. Some key tasks include:

- Engage leadership to determine emergency operations activation (that is, TSA CIMG).
- Activate and prepare to deploy liaison officers, key resources, and capabilities.
- Gain domain awareness and situational awareness throughout the Nation's transportation sector.
- Institute policies/plans and deploy resources to protect the workforce and the traveling public.

⁵³ National Response Framework, 2019, p. 7.

As appropriate, the response is dominated by efforts to provide coordinated, consistent, and unified public messaging that is credible. It also must provide clear, timely, and actionable information that is accessible and culturally and linguistically appropriate for all affected populations. These messages should adhere to the principles of risk communications, even in areas unaffected by the incident. They should also include information regarding the threat, hazard, or incident, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance that is available.⁵⁴

Attaining accurate and timely situational awareness across the spectrum of transportation sector partners is critical to ensuring the timely and effective deployment of resources to respond. It is also imperative that key medical leadership from all agencies and stakeholders involved collaborate and identify best practices to protect the workforce and the traveling public. Key leaders from all agencies should also be engaged to provide guidance for the response.

Deliberate plans, already developed before an outbreak, should be reviewed and followed, while ensuring adequate flexibility to respond appropriately. Plans should assist responders in identifying the necessary resources, personnel, and logistics needed to respond.

In the event the communicable disease reaches the WHO and CDC's definition of a pandemic, operations of the CIMG may need to be modified (such as social distancing, telework, etc.) to ensure continuous operations.

Response Activities

- Deploy appropriate resources to ensure the safety and security of the workforce and traveling public.
- Implement published plans to disseminate guidance regarding PPE use to the workforce.
- Facilitate provision for appropriate PPE in affected and cascading regions (distribution and dispensing).
- Begin crisis action planning and as needed, modify plans or standard operating procedures based on current event information.
- Integrate and implement the core elements of the communications strategy to:
 - Maintain trust with the traveling public during and after communicable disease responses.
 - Support coordination and the efficient use of limited resources.
 - Provide relevant health and welfare information to enable the workforce to make well-informed decisions.
 - Minimize social and economic impacts.
- Review and alter workforce travel plans to minimize disease spread.
- Anticipate and plan for appropriate levels and distribution of PPE recommended by the

⁵⁴ FEMA BIA FIOP, p. 224.

CDC, DHS OHS, and TSA OCMO.

- Maintain records of MCMs and PPE logistics.
- Implement a communications strategy in concert with the DHS Office of Public Affairs.

Sustained Operations

During this phase, the use of resources and adjustments in staffing will occur in a manner that ensures the safety of the workforce and the traveling public. Examples include acquiring additional PPE for the workforce, changing internal agency policies, and implementing effective physical protection measures. As the situation evolves, so too will the required quantities or types of resources.

Recovery Operations

When the communicable disease outbreak has lessened and stability has been achieved, the recovery process begins. Continuing to regularly update the workforce and transportation stakeholders on any changes to the communicable disease is imperative. Based on guidance from federal decision-making authorities (such as the White House, the Office of Personnel Management, and the UCG), TSA will consider or decide to transition back to a steady state, leading to the deactivation of support elements in this plan.⁵⁵

TSA's emphasis on response gradually gives way to the short-term recovery operations of helping locally affected workforce personnel and their families and restoring security operations to normal levels. Additional efforts at this time should focus on restocking resources (MCMs and PPE), updating plans, and beginning to rebuild or restore essential services.

When the status of the communicable disease outbreak returns to levels acceptable to all interagency partners and stakeholders, that signals entry into the recovery period. At this stage, it is important to review and update processes, procedures, and preparedness and response plans based on the findings of an after-action report process.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ FEMA Biological Annex FIOP, p. 224.

⁵⁶ DHS PEIDWPP, Annex C: Operations, October 7, 2016.



6.0 RESOURCES, FUNDING, AND OBSTACLES

Resources and Funding

The Economy Act enables other federal departments and agencies to obtain reimbursement from one federal department/agency for the performance of actions in support of another. Other authorities exist that enable HHS to coordinate a response.

For example, the declaration of a PHE triggers the availability of special funding regulatory waivers, grant-making, or other emergency measures to aid or speed the response to an incident.

The *Financial Management Support Annex* to the NRF provides basic financial management guidance for all federal departments and agencies that provide support for incidents that require a coordinated federal response. Federal funding for federal response operations complies with applicable laws and authorities, as outlined in that document.

Obstacles

Balancing Requirements

As TSA's mission is to protect the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce, it balances the requirement to protect its workforce (and the traveling public) and the performance of its daily mission essential functions. Because communicable diseases are contagious and their longevity and impact on people are often difficult to predict in the early stages, TSA and all transportation sector partners must learn how to protect their workforce while ensuring reliable, safe, and secure travel continues.

Throughout COVID-19, global transportation systems were met with this reality, and TSA, working with the CDC and sector partners, balanced these requirements daily. Although TSA and the rest of the transportation sector were not spared the loss of life by members of their workforce, through deliberate workforce and workplace protective actions, TSA continued to meet its responsibilities and achieve its mission.

Reaction Time

Once notified of a communicable disease outbreak, the reaction time needed to understand the threat, identify appropriate measures and implement them is vital to both safeguarding human lives and ensuring essential functions can continue. During steady state activities, TSOs' use of PPE is voluntary in the performance of their duties, but during COVID-19, TSA's workforce (field and headquarters) was required to wear masks, socially distance, implement increased personal and workplace hygiene procedures, adhere to the federal employee immunization mandate, and, where possible, maximize telework flexibilities, to protect themselves and the traveling public.

TSA's ability to work with its government and industry stakeholders, and in particular the AFGE, via TSA's Health, Safety, and Wellness Committee, enabled rapid implementation of those requirements with both field and headquarters personnel. This ability served to save lives

and continued to ensure comprehensive transportation security, particularly in the aviation sector.

Information Sharing

The need to communicate timely and accurate information with stakeholders and the workforce is paramount to supporting the needs of those that are affected or have a role to play in response to a communicable disease outbreak. However, in the rush to communicate, the information shared is often duplicative, redundant, and conflicting depending on where or when the information is seen.



TSA recognizes this and, in an effort to minimize redundancy during a communicable disease outbreak like COVID-19, developed a webpage to provide the traveling public with information on the latest CDC-directed safety protocols that travelers were asked to follow. The website also served to inform the traveling public of what they could expect to see regarding the use of PPE by its TSOs.

As stated earlier, TSA continues to ensure information is shared with the public through the TSA Contact Center and the TSA Disability and Multicultural Coalition. TSA also uses many social media platforms (such as X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, and Instagram) to push information to stakeholders, ultimately with the goal of providing clear, concise, timely, and accurate information to those travelers who need it. When future communicable disease outbreaks occur, regardless of whether they reach the level of a pandemic, TSA will be ready to share similar protective information based on CDC guidance in a timely and actionable way using all available information sharing mechanisms.

7.0 PLAN SUSTAINMENT

This plan will be updated every two years, in accordance with the requirements outlined in the NDAA section 6412 legislative language referenced below.

(5) Review of plan

Not later than two years after the date on which the plan is disseminated under paragraph (4), and biennially thereafter, the Secretary, acting through the Administrator and in coordination with the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland Security, shall review the plan and, after consultation with the partners identified under paragraphs (3)(A)(i) through (3)(A)(iv), update the plan as appropriate.

(B) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date on which the transportation security preparedness plan required under subsection (x) of section 114 of title 49, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), is disseminated under paragraph (4) of such subsection (x), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report containing the results of a study assessing the transportation security preparedness plan, including an analysis of—

(1) whether such plan aligns with relevant Federal plans and strategies for communicable disease outbreaks; and

(2) the extent to which the Transportation Security Administration is prepared to implement the plan.



APPENDIX 1: TSA ENGAGEMENT PLATFORMS AND FORUMS

Departments and Agencies

Engagement Platforms	Description
HHS Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR)	Leads the Nation’s medical and public health preparedness for, response to, and recovery from disasters and other public health emergencies.
HHS Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)	Acts as the Nation’s leading science-based, data-driven, service organization that protects the public’s health.
HHS Secretary’s Operations Center	Serves as the primary emergency operations center for HHS, whose mission is to protect the health, safety, and security of the Nation by serving as the 24/7/365 focal point for public health and medical information collection, sharing, and analysis, as well as facilitating the coordination of HHS preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation operational resource requirements. It maintains a “steady-state” 24-hour watch function for situational awareness of any emerging situation, nationally or internationally, which may require a coordinated health and medical federal disaster response.
DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)	Is responsible for coordinating with other Federal efforts and developing a strategy and policy for the Department of Homeland Security to plan for, detect, and protect against the importation, possession, storage, transportation, development, or use of unauthorized chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials, devices, or agents in the United States and to protect against an attack using such materials, devices, or agents against the United States.
DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	FEMA and its National Response Coordination Center provides overall emergency management coordination, conducts operational planning, deploys national-level entities, and collects and disseminates incident information as it builds and maintains a common operating picture.
DHS National Operations Center	Serves as the Department’s primary, national-level hub for situational awareness, a common operating picture, information fusion, information sharing, and executive communications: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides timely reporting and products derived from traditional and social media monitoring; DHS Component reporting; federal, state, local, tribal, territorial governments, and sector reports to support senior-leader decision making • Provides and maintain information dissemination tools such as a common operating picture and the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to facilitate information sharing with the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial governments, and private sector professionals

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides executive-level communications capabilities to link senior leaders to facilitate unity of effort and incident management efforts.
DHS Office of Health Security	The Office of Health Security, led by the Department's Chief Medical Officer, serves as the principal medical, workforce health and safety, and public health authority for DHS. The Chief Medical Officer also serves as the Designated Agency Safety and Health Official for DHS.
DOT Transportation Operations Center	Serves as DOT's focal point for situational awareness, information fusion and sharing, decision support product development, and DOT's liaison with Federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, and private sector operations centers.
DOL Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)	Ensures safe and healthful working conditions for workers by setting and enforcing standards and by providing training, outreach, education and assistance.
Unified Coordination Group	This group, led by the LFA, or co-led by multiple LFAs, defines and coordinates training requirements, stakeholder personal protective equipment (PPE), processes and protocols for responding to incidents of varying scale and complexity, and determines the necessary facility infrastructure (e.g., isolation areas or designated aircraft parking areas) related to disease outbreaks.
Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) and Government Coordinating Councils (GCC)	<p>SCCs serve as the sector's voice and facilitate the government's collaboration with the sector for critical infrastructure security and resilience activities. Serve as a strategic communications and coordination mechanism between owners, operators, trade associations, suppliers, and the government during emerging threats or response and recovery operations, as determined by the sector.</p> <p>GCCs are formed as the government counterpart for each SCC to enable interagency and cross-jurisdictional coordination. The GCCs are comprised of representatives from across various levels of government (FSLTT) as appropriate to the operating landscape of each individual sector.</p>
Crisis Action Team	When activated, participation on Crisis Action Teams will provide updated situational awareness and consistent understanding of requirements from the LFA, as well as actions being taken across the whole-of-government. From there, TSA can convey approved actionable information and workforce protection guidance on a regular and routine basis using the standing engagement platforms and capabilities described in this table.
TSA Event Network (TEN)	A teleconferencing channel for providing an alert of a security incident or event in near real-time, thus hastening situational awareness and understanding by operational personnel.

Standing Conference Lines	<p>National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL): A standing conference line designated, maintained, and supported by DHS Public Affairs as the primary means for interagency incident communications information sharing during an incident requiring federal coordination.</p> <p>State Incident Communications Conference Line (SICCL): A dedicated Federal-State incident communications conference line.</p> <p>Private Sector Incident Communications Conference Line (PICCL): A standing line to provide timely information to critical infrastructure communicators.</p>
Safer Federal Workforce Task Force	Mission, per Executive Order 13991: “The Task Force shall provide ongoing guidance to heads of agencies on the operation of the Federal Government, the safety of its employees, and the continuity of Government functions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such guidance shall be based on public health best practices as determined by CDC and other public health experts”.
Workforce Protection Coordination Cell (WPCC)	A senior-level DHS advisory working group.
Workforce Protection Senior Advisory Group (WPSAG)	Consists of the DHS CMO, Undersecretary of Management, Operations Director, and DHS Components that advise the DHS Secretary and report their operational status when communicable disease outbreaks rise to the level of a pandemic. The recommendations from this group and guidance from other federal decision-making authorities (e.g., the White House, Office of Personnel Management) is used by the DHS Secretary on additional support activities to execute.
Domestic Event Network (DEN)	A 24/7 FAA sponsored telephonic conference call network (recorded) that includes all the air route traffic control centers (ARTCC) in the United States. It also includes various other governmental agencies that monitor the DEN. The purpose of the DEN is to provide timely notification to the appropriate authority that there is an emerging air-related problem or incident.
DHS or TSA Town Halls	DHS and TSA leadership may utilize a town hall format, either in-person or virtual, to convey any information they deem appropriate for this type of forum. This allows them to communicate directly with the workforce and address direct feedback through a question-and-answer format.
TSA Critical Incident Management Group (CIMG)	When activated, the CIMG is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the TSA response to an incident, from activation through post incident.

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)	The HSIN is the Department of Homeland Security's official system for trusted sharing of <i>Sensitive but Unclassified</i> information between FSLTT, international, and private sector partners. Mission operators use HSIN to access Homeland Security data, send requests securely between agencies, manage operations, coordinate planned event safety and security, respond to incidents, and share the information they need to fulfill their missions and help keep their communities safe.
Emergency Support Function #1: Transportation	Provides support by assisting SLTT insular area, and Federal Governmental entities, voluntary organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector in the management of transportation systems and infrastructure during domestic threats or in response to actual or potential incidents.

International Engagement

Engagement Platforms	Description
International Air Transport Association (IATA)	<p>IATA's mission is to represent, lead, and serve the airline industry:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve understanding of the air transport industry among decision makers and increase awareness of the benefits that aviation brings to national and global economies. • Challenge unreasonable rules and charges, hold regulators and governments to account, and strive for sensible regulation. • Develop global commercial standards upon which the air transport industry is built. • Assist airlines by simplifying processes and increasing passenger convenience while reducing costs and improving efficiency. • Help airlines to operate safely, securely, efficiently, and economically under clearly defined rules. • Provide professional support to all industry stakeholders with a wide range of products and expert services.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)	The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a United Nations agency which helps 193 countries to cooperate together and share their skies to their mutual benefit.
ICAO Council's Aviation Recovery Task Force (CART)	The work of the ICAO CART guidance to governments and industry operators in order to restart the international air transport sector and recover from the impacts of COVID-19 on a coordinated global basis. The CART's work on its recovery <i>Report</i> and the accompanying 'Take-Off' guidance for international aviation, has kept the health, safety, and security of the travelling public of paramount concern throughout.
Collaborative Arrangement for the Prevention and Management of Public Health Events in Civil Aviation (CAPSCA)	A voluntary, cross-sectorial, multi-organizational collaboration program managed by the ICAO with support from the WHO. It brings together international, regional, national and local organizations to combine efforts to improve preparedness planning and response to public health events that affect the aviation sector such as: Communicable diseases (pandemic influenza, Zika, Ebola, Coronavirus); Chemical events (nuclear power-plant accidents); Bioterrorism; Volcanic ash; Water and food safety; Hygiene and waste management; Drones in humanitarian operations; Disaster management (natural or man-made disasters).

Stakeholder Engagement

Engagement Platforms	Description
Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC)	Advises the TSA administrator on aviation security matters, including the development, refinement, and implementation of policies, programs, rulemaking, and security directives pertaining to aviation security.
Surface Transportation Security Advisory Committee (STSAC)	Advises the TSA Administrator on surface transportation security matters, including the development, refinement, and implementation of policies, programs, initiatives, rulemakings and security directives pertaining to surface transportation security.
Transportation System Sector (TSS) Council Charters and Membership	For a comprehensive list of aviation and surface stakeholders with whom TSA regularly engages, please visit - https://www.cisa.gov/transportation-systems-sector-council-charters-and-membership
TSA Disability and Multicultural Coalition	Provides input to TSA on how to improve airport security screening for travelers from underrepresented communities.

APPENDIX 2: CONSIDERATIONS

Information and data gathered through consultation, collaboration, and coordination with other interagency efforts, as required under the NDAA Section 6412, resulted in a comprehensive Plan – allowing for TSA to be better positioned to protect its workforce and to communicate those protection measures to its transportation partners. Further, the results of Section 6411 and 6412 surveys and analysis were considered, along with the plan required under Section 6415, as directed by the requirements outlined in NDAA Section 6412, in the development of this Plan.

Throughout the development of this Plan, from initial literature review to final signature, TSA held numerous consultative discussions within TSA and across the federal interagency to ensure an accurate and thorough Plan.

As directed in the 6412 requirements, the following surveys, analysis, reports, and documents were considered as they were made available.

6411 – Findings of the survey required under NDAA 6411.

TSA considered the findings and analysis of TSA’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic (NDAA Sec 6411) and addressed many of the issues within section 5.0 Protecting the Safety of the TSA Workforce, which includes:

- Engineering controls and the implementation of the Requirements and Capabilities Analysis Playbook recommendations to enhance physical protections for the workforce and the traveling public. This section also covers use of PPE and the incorporation of the ICM at the checkpoints.
- Vaccinations are discussed on page 15 under Facts and Assumptions, as well as in the Protecting the Safety of the TSA Workforce under Medical Countermeasures.
- The ability for TSA to adjust its administrative policies on an as needed basis was incorporated into the Administrative Actions as a subsection.

6414 – Findings of the “Analysis of Preparedness of the Transportation Security System of the United States for Public Health Threats”, as required under NDAA 6414.

The stakeholders listed below all participated in a TSA workshop in March 2022, which led to the findings and final TSA analysis preparedness report to Congress as required by Section 6414 of the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act.

Government: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, National Transportation Safety Board, and Surface Transportation Security Advisory Committee.

State: Massachusetts Department of Transportation, New Jersey Transit Authority, and New Orleans Regional Transit Authority.

Local: Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Austin, Texas), City of Los Angeles, Dallas Area Rapid Transit, Multnomah County Sheriff's Office, Orange County Transportation Authority, and Regional Transit Authority Police.

Private: American Public Transportation Association, AMTRAK, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Berkshire Hathaway Gas Transmission & Storage, Greyhound Lines, Houston Metro, IndyGo, Montebello Bus Lines, National Association of Chemical Distributors, National Express LLC, Pacific Gas & Electric, SMART Transportation Division, WMATA, Xcel Energy Inc.

As stated in the findings of Section 6414, public health is the science of protecting and improving the health of people and their communities. It involves detecting, preventing, and responding to communicable diseases, including within all modes of the transportation security system.

TSA's analysis examined:

1. The risks of public health threats to the U.S. transportation security system, including to transportation hubs, transportation security stakeholders, TSA personnel, and passengers;
2. Information sharing challenges among relevant components of DHS, other federal agencies, international entities, and transportation security stakeholders; and
3. Impacts to TSA policies and procedures for securing the transportation security system.

TSA coordinated its analysis with representatives of the DHS CMO and OHS, Office of the Secretary of HHS, and transportation security stakeholders.

TSA found the U.S. transportation security system made significant progress implementing preparedness measures to address public health threats during the COVID-19 pandemic in the areas of planning, information sharing, logistics, and response to public health threats. Actions taken by the U.S. transportation security system have reduced the risk of rapid infection spread in crowded transportation systems and disruptions to public health supply chains.

6415 – Plan to reduce the spread of coronavirus at passenger screening checkpoints required under NDAA 6415.

TSA specifically considered and incorporated the following topics from sec 6415, primarily in section 5 of the plan:

- Collaboration with foreign partners.
- The TSA *Communicable Disease Response Playbook: Solutions and Best Practices for Mitigation, 2020*, which highlighted the use of engineering controls to protect the workforce and traveling public.
- Infection Control Monitor.
- Communications campaign.
- Human Capital and Human Resources Policies.

Lessons Learned

TSA considered various types of lessons learned into this Plan. Before its development the team cast a broad net to identify and review relevant research and literature to develop best practices from throughout the interagency, scientific and international community. During TSA's consultations with FAA, DOT, HHS ASPR, HHS CDC, DHS CWMD, CBP, DHS OHS, and various TSA stakeholders, a range of items were considered when developing this plan. Following an extensive literature review and during those consultations with D/A representatives, as well as TSA Program Offices who regularly interact with both domestic and international partners, stakeholders and the traveling public, TSA took into consideration the following to incorporate within the Plan:

- Communications with the interagency, partners and stakeholders and the workforce.
- Administrative flexibilities.
- Best practices for developing and distributing SDs and EAs.
- COVID-19 reports and recommendations based on Administration's response to COVID-19.
- COVID-19 lessons learned and the findings of the June 2021 GAO audit⁵⁷.
- *The First Annual Report on Progress Towards Implementation of the American Pandemic Preparedness Plan*, 2022, A Report by the White House Steering Committee for Pandemic Innovation of the National Science and Technology Council.
- TSA's *Communicable Disease Response Playbook: Solutions and Best Practices for Mitigation*, 2020. This document provides an overview of applicable requirements, best practices, and recommendations for further mitigating the spread of COVID-19 solutions.

Also, the *First Annual Report on Progress Towards Implementation of the American Pandemic Preparedness Plan*, 2022, a report by the White House Steering Committee for Pandemic Innovation of the National Science and Technology Council, September 2022, was considered, which recognizes that significant progress has been achieved throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and also creates opportunities that can lead to enduring capabilities against a wide range of biological threats. Building on the above-referenced Plan, the *National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security*, released in 2022, outlines a set of bold goals to transform the Nation's biodefense and health security by launching a whole of government approach to detect, prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from biological incidents.

Another document that helped to shape TSA's preparedness and response capabilities for future communicable disease outbreaks is its *Communicable Disease Response Playbook: Solutions and Best Practices for Mitigation*, 2020. This document provides an overview of applicable requirements, best practices, and recommendations for further mitigating the spread of COVID-19 solutions. Ultimately, in support of the larger goal of minimizing the transmission of COVID-19 and other communicable diseases to support the safe resumption of air travel.

⁵⁷ GAO COVID-19, *TSA Could Better Monitor Its Efforts to Reduce Infectious Disease Spread at Checkpoints*, GAO-21-364, June 2021.

By utilizing the analysis and findings described above, it allows for a thorough description of the activities and actions that must take place to ensure TSA and the transportation sector are well prepared for a communicable disease outbreak. Those findings shaped the priorities and objectives needed to support preparedness and response efforts and illustrated the importance of timely and actionable communication and collaboration from HHS through TSA and across the transportation system sector. By understanding the actions undertaken during COVID-19 response, TSA is better positioned to implement SDs and EAs in an even more timely fashion, ultimately to facilitate and protect its workforce, processes, and technologies through comprehensive preparedness and response activities.

APPENDIX 3: ACRONYMS

AFGE	American Federation of Government Employees
ASPR	Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response
BIA	Biological Incident Annex
BINA	Biological Incident Notification and Assessment
CAPSCA	Collaborative Arrangement for the Prevention and Management of Public Health Events in Civil Aviation
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CIMG	Critical Incident Management Group
CMO	Chief Medical Officer
COOP	Continuity of Operations
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
D/A	Department(s) and Agency(s)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOL	Department of Labor
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
EA	Emergency Amendment
ESF	Emergency Support Function
EUA	Emergency use authorization
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAM	Federal Air Marshal
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIOP	Federal Interagency Operational Plans
FSLTT	federal, state, local, tribal and territorial
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCC	Government Coordinating Councils
HAN	Health Alert Network
HC	Human Capital
HCAM	Human Capital Advisory Memo
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HSIN	Homeland Security Information Network
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization

ICM	Infection Control Monitor
JIC	Joint Information Center
LE/FAMS	Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
MCMs	Medical Countermeasures
MEF	Mission Essential Function
Mpox	Monkeypox
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NICCL	National Incident Communications Conference Line
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIOSH	National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NRF	National Response Framework
NSC	National Security Council
OCMO	Office of the Chief Medical Officer
OHS	Office of Health Security
PEIDWPP	Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Disease Workforce Protection Plan
PHE	Public Health Emergency
PHSA	Public Health Service Act
PICCL	Private Incident Communications Conference Line
POD	Point of Dispensing
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
PPE	personal protective equipment
RFA	Request for Assistance
RFI	Request for Information
SA	Situational Awareness
SCC	Sector Coordinating Councils
SCPA	Strategic Communications and Public Affairs
SD	Security Directive
SICCL	State Incident Communications Conference Line
SLTT	State, local, tribal, and territorial
SRMA	Sector Risk Management Agency
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TSAR	Transportation Security Administration Representative
TSO	Transportation Security Officer
TSOC	Transportation Security Operations Center
TSS	Transportation System Sector

U.S.	United States
U.S.C.	United States Code
UCG	Unified Coordination Group
WHO	World Health Organization